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Can Democracy Be its Own Enemy? 
The Intended Consequences of the  




Ironically enough, the way state socialism took its leave from the history of 
Romanians bestowed on elections the privilege to become the central political 
resource of the post-communist transformations. Unlike what had befallen during 
the great revolutionary movements of earlier periods (French, American, Russian), 
state socialism has been replaced by a multi-party democracy, that is by a type of 
political regime that predated it both in chronological and logical terms, and which 
it had once dismissed from the Romanian constitutional life. Suffice it to say that 
the demise of communism is often considered to be a unique kind of revolution, 
one that looks into the past, over the decayed shoulders of state socialism, for its 
theory and models. To use a Marxian language, representative democracy 
eventually expropriated its own expropriator. Accordingly, the post-communist 
society was inclined to make use of elections as a substitute for the social divides 
leveled by communism. 
In Romania, the downfall of state socialism was not a negotiated process 
involving a plurality of would-be political actors, but an abrupt event staged by a 
single performer, the Communist Party itself. An important, if not obligatory 
juncture on the democratization path was thus skipped over, as no public debate 
on the legitimacy of regime change, and on rules that should regulate the 
competition between state sovereignty and civic autonomy was ever organized. 
Communism’s breakdown was taken to be as natural an occurrence as its 
governance. In consequence, post-communism was reluctant to immediately 
institutionalize and legitimize the conflicts of opinions and interests, and was 
slow in considering the emergence of new social divides as normal fallouts of 
democracy. Long after December 22nd 1989, Romanian society continued to look 
for anti-political aggregation blueprints. 
First, a genuine institutional structure of the revolution was not put in place, 
as a proper revolutionary theory would have deemed necessary. From December 
1989 to June 1990, the country was mmerely run by a provisional government 
that did not fill the gap between two totally different states, but aimed at the re-
form, be it radical, of the socialist state and of the socialist mode of production. 
Although Romania has traveled across a revolutionary stage, most of the pieces 
of the socialist state began to fall in their previous place, or in a nearby one. If, as 
Marx believed, the state is but the executive board of a ruling class, it follows 
that the communist apparatus had no reason to declare bankruptcy, but needed 
only to reform its institutional assets in order to be even more competitive on the 
new political market. 
Thus, the political class that controlled the sate during and after December 
1989 was able to turn to its own account the repeal of state socialism. For the lesson 
they learned from Leninism is that, in order to take over the political initiative, it is 
of outmost importance to understand before the opponent does ”what is to be 
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done” in order to make a given majority believe that its toils and concerns are 
properly phrased and better voiced. The communist local leadership already acted, 
in the 1970s and 1980s as a mediator between a socialist state officially determined 
to plan the future and the current demands of a society lost in the present1. Long 
before it became the democratic and legal organization of the former communist 
networks of mediation and participation, the National Salvation Front was the best 
administrator of the downfall of communist deemed as ”the end of the future”, 
and, by the same token, the only legitimate agency of the state and, through the fic-
tion of its ”revolutionary emanation”, the sole grass-roots representative of the 
post-socialist society. 
The successor political organizations (dubbed after serial partitions 
and fusions National Salvation Front, National Democrat Salvation Front, 
Party of the Social Democracy of Romania, and Social Democrat Party) 
were instrumental in disengaging from state socialism to the extent they 
managed to remain, as the Communist Party used to be in its late stage, a 
coalition of mayors, industrial managers, civil servants, union and co-
operative leaders, tradesmen, farmers, schoolteachers and the like, all con-
cerned with accommodating national policies, be them European Union 
oriented, to their local interests. Incidentally, the Social Democrats were 
implementing the solution gave by Montesquieu to the question of the best 
political regime: good governance demands that the weight of the central 
power be ”mediatized” – as the term was used in the German Empire – 
and embodied by a plurality of local elites endowed with effective autho-
rity and a large autonomy of decision. If that is the case, Romanian journa-
lists have been uninspired when they dubbed these elites, whose influence 
prevailed in local politics and business under the 2001-2004 government, as ”local 
barons”. They should rather be classed with the dukes of the République des ducs 
which replaced in France, after 1870, the liberal and centralist Second Em-
pire. Against the administration of the Democrat Convention (1997-2000), 
that placed reliance on the normative force of the decisions taken by the 
national government, the Social Democrats have ruled the country by re-
mobilizing the social networks of state socialism under the informal juris-
diction of the traditional local patrons2. 
As the last embodiment of the Communist Party3, the Social Democrats were 
compelled – in government (1992-1996, 2001-2004) and in opposition (1997-2000) – 
to set up an organization conducive to political participation and embedded in in-
tricate networks of civil society. However, the Social Democrat Party should neither 
                                                
1 For a detailed analysis of political participation under state socialism see Daniel BARBU, 
”Participation politique et clivages politiques en Roumanie. Du communisme au post-com-
munisme”, in Jean-Michel DE WAELE (édité par), Les clivages politiques en Europe Centrale et 
Orientale, Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2004, pp. 137-165. 
2 Random examples of such Social Democrat patrons that were already in charge of social 
networks of bargaining and mutual obligations before 1989 are Ion Stan, president of the party 
organization of Dâmboviţa and former boss of the socialist convenience stores of the county, or 
Mircea Deaconu, executive president of the party organization of Vrancea, and former director 
of the forest holding of the county. 
3 Alexandra IONESCU, ”Régime politique, partis et bureaucratie d’État”, in Studia Politica. 
Romanian Political Science Review, vol. III, no. 4, 2003, pp. 877-899. 
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be regarded as a representative or advocate of civil society before state authorities, 
nor as an independent negotiator between state and society, but rather as a state 
agency which task was to translate the legal language of governmental policies 
into a diversity of social dialects used by various and often antagonist interests. 
This function of interpreting the state and its policies in the idiom of society is only 
by incident related to the similar function fulfilled by western political parties1. In-
deed, the renewed or transfigured communist parties are not a creation of civil so-
ciety. They initiated their post-communist career as part of the state. Even as the 
steadiest part of the socialist state. This would be the only way to explain the disci-
plined behavior of the public administration and economic management after the 
formal demise of Romanian totalitarianism on December 22nd 1989. That particular 
day, the Communist Party officially vanished away for good as a public organiza-
tion but did not give up his position of informal negotiator between a state un-
willing to transform itself and a diffident society unaware it may become a 
self-ascertained and self-reliant body politic2. 
In the long run, a party democracy3 was probably the expected outcome of the 
sudden institutional retirement of the Communist Party as a social mediator. Since 
the 1992 elections, and beyond any constitutional arrangement, what might be 
considered to be, with a term designed to capture the Italian political landscape, a 
genuine particracy4 was set up as a method of government in which parties hold 
jointly the complete monopoly of all political personnel, resources and policies. 
Particracy should be understood as different from the more traditional party gov-
ernment, to the extent the parties not only colonize and capitalize on all public in-
stitutions and positions that make up the political regime, but they rather become 
the regime itself5. 
Such a regime does not function as a sum total of the public institutions and of 
the normative regulations of the state, but as a totality of the parties competing for 
power. L’État c’est nous might say these parties who stand above the law as long as, 
being in absolute control of both legislative and executive branches, they make and 
tell the law, including the one pertaining to their own organization. Post-com-
munist Romanian parties act to some degree, and in a rather perverse manner, as a 
constitutional monarch. They rule, but they do not govern. Undeniably, state so-
cialism used to be less interested in producing legislation than in inducing social 
behavior. On the contrary, post-communist governments measure their perform-
ances by the volume of their normative production and are indifferent to the legal 
behavior of the citizens. For instance, in January 1998, the Prime Minister of that 
                                                
1 Peter MAIR, ”Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State”, in Richard S. KATZ, 
Peter MAIR (eds), How Parties Organize. Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western 
Democracies, Sage, London and Thousand Oaks, 1994, p. 8. 
2 A state-in-society perspective, as advanced by Joel S. MIGDAL, State in Society. Studying 
How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge & New York, 2001, is useful in ascertaining the contribution of the Communist 
Party in interlacing state and society. 
3 V. Bernard MANIN, Principes du gouvernement représentatif, Flammarion, Paris, 1995, 
pp. 270-272. 
4 For the scope and meaning of the term see Mauro CALISE, ”The Italian Particracy: 
Beyond President and Parliament”, in Political Science Quarterly 109/3, 1994, pp. 442-444. 
5 Gianfranco PASQUINO, Il sistema politico italiano. Autorià, istituzioni, società, Bononia 
University Press, Bologna, 2002, pp. 15-21. 
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time was arguing against what was generally considered the failure of his gov-
ernment by underlining that he had issued in twelve months 1 500 ordinances, ex-
ecutive orders and decisions. For him, this was clear evidence of the efficiency of 
his mandate. This frame of mind was not singular. Post-communist governments 
compete with each other in terms of the quantity of legislation they manufacture 
and promote. 
This Romanian brand of particracy is not limited to the joint control political 
parties exercise over the branches of power, including the judicial one, or to the es-
calating legislative inflation. Unlike in the presidential or parliamentary regimes, 
in a particracy – and the Romanian one is no exception – the head of the govern-
ment is often appointed outside, if not against, the logic of the electoral process1. 
Theodor Stolojan in 1991, Nicolae Văcăroiu one year after, Victor Ciorbea in 1996 
and Mugur Isărescu in 1999 were Prime Ministers who never run for any nation-
ally elected office. They ended up at heading the government because they were 
hand picked by the President. As opposite, in December 2000 and in December 
2004, the designated Prime Ministers were in command of major coalitions of par-
liamentary parties. Still, in both instances, Adrian Năstase was the head figure of 
the coalition that got most popular votes and the largest number of mandates in 
both Houses of the Parliament. In 2000, his coalition of the Party of the Social De-
mocracy, the Social Democrat Party and the Humanist Party amounted together to 
3 968 464 votes for the House, which represented 36.61% of the ballots and 44.92% 
of the seats, i.e. 155 representatives. Similar proportions were obtained in the Sen-
ate. At the November 28, 2004 elections, the coalition of the Social Democrats and 
Humanists, presided over by the same Adrian Năstase withstood the natural ero-
sion of them being for four years in office and got 3 730 532 votes for the House, 
representing 36.8% of the ballots, which gave them 132 seats, that is 39.75% of the 
total number of seats. And there is more to it. In the immediate aftermath of both 
elections, Adrian Năstase could count on the support of the Hungarian Democrat 
Union, formalized in 2004 by an electoral agreement. That is, Adrian Năstase could 
rely in 2000 on 27 more representatives (7.82% of the seats) and in 2004 on a bonus 
of 22 Hungarians representatives (6.62% of the seats)2. 
However, the fact that Năstase formed the government in 2000 but was not 
nominated in 2004 is not related to the slightly inferior results his coalition and elec-
toral alliances have obtained in the latter elections. He claimed in both occasions the 
right to become Prime Minister as leader of the largest plurality, if not majority, in 
Parliament. This pretence was denied in 2004 by the President. Notwithstanding 
that the Alliance of the Liberals and Democrats legged 5 points and half a million 
votes behind the Social Democrats, Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu was called by the new 
President to assemble a coalition government. Not only he succeeded in so doing, 
but he was also able to ground his cabinet on a parliamentary majority different 
from the one voted in by the citizens on elections day. How can it be? 
First, it is fair to say that Adrian Năstase contention to take over again the 
government in 2004 was but a lip tribute to the popular vote. As an experienced 
veteran the Romanian particracy he knew that it was not for him to be in charge of 
the government. He was himself a candidate in the presidential elections and he 
                                                
1 Mauro CALISE, Dopo la partitocrazia. L’Italia tra modelli e realtà, Einaudi, Torino, 1994, p. 42. 
2 The best presentation and analysis of Romanian elections from 1990 to 2000 in Cristian 
PREDA, România postcomunistă şi România interbelică, Meridiane, Bucureşti, 2002, pp. 13-60. 
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was defeated by Traian Băsescu in the second round with a difference shy of 
250 000 votes. Therefore, he immediately ran for the office of speaker of the House, 
position he won with no real difficulty, as leader of a parliamentary majority de-
signed by the popular vote and enhanced by political and electoral agreements. He 
indicated this way that, in spite of what ballots, pledges and protocols may point 
out politically, the nomination for the Prime Minister’s office is a presidential pre-
rogative of a discretionary nature. 
Secondly, the new President took up, as his predecessors did, the task of estab-
lishing a presidential majority different from the one indicated by suffrage. And he 
did that at the expense of all electoral and political agreements that were signed 
before the elections. In fact, particracy itself was its main ally. In post-communist 
Romania, governments are not the democratic outcome of elections. Rather, elec-
tions are a tool to legitimize governments appointed by the President. Since as 
early as 1866, Romania has experienced what might be called by analogy a ”dualist 
regime”1. As in the constitutional arrangement of the Second French Empire, the 
original Belgian constitution or the Albertine Statute, executive and legislative 
powers were shared by the Palace and the Parliament. In Romania, from 1866 to 
1938, this power sharing was regulated by the following mechanism: the King 
nominated a Prime Minister, the Prime Minister organized elections that, for not 
being free and fair, offered him a solid majority upon which he relied until the 
King decided to charge another politician, form a different party, to form a new 
cabinet2. Communism did not completely disrupt this political device and even 
made some use of it as the Parliaments of state socialism were always summoned 
by governments appointed by the supreme leadership of the Communist Party, 
which in turn used elections as a method of validating its scientific Marx-
ist-Leninist understanding of politics and society. 
To be sure, the post-communist political regime was prompt in reverting to 
dualism as a basic constitutional practice3. This proclivity was once again con-
firmed in 2004 by the most typical product of Romanian particracy, the Humanist 
Party. Since its foundation in 1991, the party never ran in elections on its own ac-
count. Nevertheless, he managed to obtain parliamentary seats in 2000 and 2004 in 
coalition with the Social Democrats and even to have an episodic hand in the gov-
ernment. Albeit after the 2000 elections, it was not entitled by law to set up parlia-
mentary groups under its label, the party was eventually granted all the privileges 
incumbent on a parliamentary party. And those privileges were significant in the 
organization of the 2004 local and general elections, which clearly favored parlia-
mentary parties over extra-parliamentary ones. In 2004, its share of seats was large 
enough to allow the Party to establish parliamentary groups in both Houses and to 
become the pivotal agency of the very functioning of the regime. The Humanist 
leader explicitly engaged in what could be described as a variety of consociational 
politics4: on the one hand he backed the Social Democrats in their effort to win the 
influential positions of speakers of the two Houses, but, on the other hand, he 
                                                
1 Guglielmo FERRERO, Pouvoir. Les Génies invisibles de la Cité, Librairie Générale Française, 
Paris, 1988, pp. 111-114. 
2 Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă. Politică şi societate în România postcomunistă, 2nd ed., 
Nemira, Bucureşti, 2004, pp. 172-174. 
3 Ibidem, pp. 175-177. 
4 Arend LIJPHART, Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration, Yale University 
Press, New Haven and London, 1977, pp. 25-47. 
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pulled his party out of the National Union with the Social Democrat Party in order 
to support and to be part of the government of the Liberal-Democrat Alliance. For 
the first time in post-communist Romanian politics, Dan Voiculescu voiced – 
through his actions and in various public interventions – an explicit definition of 
particracy: no one party should be excluded from power and no single party should 
be allowed to indulge in a monopolistic exploitation of the state. Or, in other 
words, whatever the result of an election, nobody looses and nobody wins. Losses 
and gains should rather be shared by all parties-in-Parliament. This is why the 
President can always muster up a presidential majority. Like in any dualist regime, 
the head of state is both the executive officer and the warrant of a stable and estab-
lished party system. As the constitutional resident of the Palace is, since 1990, 
elected by universal suffrage, it entails that the only election that really does matter 
is the presidential one. The popular vote replaced the dynastic succession of the 
constitutional monarchy and democratic centralism of the communist age in estab-
lishing who should be the definitive depositor of the national sovereignty, as well 
as its authoritative exegete. 
What was Traian Băsescu supposed to infer after the November 28, 2004 elec-
tions? Having been elected in the run off with 5 126 794 votes standing for 28% of 
the electoral body and 51.23% of the actual ballots, he had to work with a Parlia-
ment composed of parties and coalitions that passed the threshold, which gathered 
8 866 764 votes, representing 87.47% of the citizens that cast their ballots (10 136 460) 
and 48.06% of the 18 449 344 registered voters1. This is a percentage comparable to 
the 2000 elections, but disconnect from the 1992 and 1996 elections, when the par-
ties that made their way into Parliament relied on the ballots of about 60% of the 
registered voters2. In November 2004, except for the Greater Romania Party, all the 
parties were bound by political or electoral agreements. On one side stood the po-
litical family of the new President, the Alliance Justice and Truth of the Liberals 
and Democrats, which was upheld by 31.48% of the voters, i.e. 17.29% of the regis-
tered voters3. They were challenged by the incumbent coalition of the National Un-
ion of the Social Democrats and Humanists associated with the Hungarian Party. 
Together, they amounted to 43% of the actual vote and 23.62% of the electoral 
body, more than the ballots Băsescu himself carried in the first round of the presi-
dential elections, when he was supported by only 19.21% of the electoral body. In 
order to overturn the results of the parliamentary elections, which obviously fa-
vored the Social Democrats and their allies, the President had to negotiate his own 
majority, based on the annulment or disruption of any previous political agree-
ment. The logic of particracy worked for him and the Alliance Justice and Truth 
with 3 191 546 votes, the Hungarian Democrat Union with 628 125 votes and the 
Humanists with a virtual share of 630 000 votes (estimated on the number of man-
dates they have gotten) succeeded in putting up a government supported by 24% 
of the registered voters and 44% of the actual voters. The political uncertainty gen-
erated by the unexpected outcome of the presidential elections was only apparent, 
as all parties were fully aware that, in government or in opposition, they ultimately 
participate in the same joint-venture. 
In the Romanian setting, particracy best expresses the fact that the executive 
branch is not a political arrangement through which the citizens of a democracy 
                                                
1 The results are taken from the official press releases of the Central Electoral Bureau.  
2 Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă, cit., pp. 198-202. 
3 All figures stand for the House; the vote for the Senate has very similar numbers. 
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mutually agree to solve their conflicts and to translate into a common political lan-
guage their particular social, economic and cultural expectations, but a bureau-
cratic machine that manages current affairs in the name and place of an yet 
unaccomplished body politic1. As the electoral slogans of Traian Băsescu’s cam-
paign for the office of mayor of Bucharest in 2000 candidly stated, the business of the 
citizen is to vote, and the business of the elected official is to hold his office the best he can. 
If, as it was famously suggested, politics is a war continued by other means, Ro-
manian politics should be construed as business pursued by other means. The av-
erage Romanian politician is equally an entrepreneur. As opposed to the modern 
ideal-type of the democratic politician2, he neither lives for politics nor lives off it. 
He usually uses politics to promote his own business. Successful businessmen are 
in turn commonly considered to be the most able candidates for ministerial posi-
tions. The legislative branch of the government is primarily a business outfit that 
operates like a chamber of commerce: tax exemptions, compensations and returns 
are granted to select companies, trade interests are balanced, financial resources 
are extracted from work and consumption and used for the consolidation of the 
private capital. The visible hand of the state is thus ministering to a variety of capi-
talism yet short of capitalists3, and which has to be bred by political entrepreneurs 
for their own use. 
Unsurprisingly, one issue loomed larger than any other on the new govern-
ment’s agenda: the introduction of a flat taxation rate of 16% tailored to favor capi-
tal over work. Though it was promised and promoted by the Alliance of Liberals 
and Democrats, the idea has no partisan character, but belongs to the common list 
of items of the Romanian particracy. It was advanced in the spring of 2004 by the 
Finance minister of Social Democrat government of that time, Mihai Tănăsescu, 
and was immediately hailed by the Prime Minister Adrian Năstase, only to be 
sternly rejected by Ion Iliescu as alien to the spirit of social democracy. The regime 
being resolutely dualist, the President had the last word and this inter-partisan 
matter had to wait for a new President in order to be turned into a public policy. 
If it is quite uncertain that Traian Băsescu won the elections of 2004 because he 
endorsed the flat rate taxation principle as a propitious one to the nascent Roma-
nian middle class, in exchange the opposite may be true: Adrian Năstase has lost 
the presidential race ever since it became evident to his social democrat constitu-
ency, made of the webs of civil society entwined in the last decades of the commu-
nist rule, that he would be rather a sponsor of capital than of work. He was 
defeated by the accelerated decline of the industrial workers’ social networks that 
were the backbone of political participation under state socialism. By carrying on 
the legacy of the Communist Party, the Social Democrats were able until 2004 to 
shape up the Romanian post-communist polity as a loosened space where indi-
vidual and corporate interests coexist in mutual indifference and in complete ethic 
invisibility. Unlike the grand Rokkanian historical cleavages, such recent mi-
cro-social divisions are rather immune to partisan mobilization and uninterested to 
                                                
1 Cf. Jean BLONDEL, ”Introduction”, in Jean BLONDEL, Maurizio COTTA (eds), The 
Nature of Party Government. A Comparative European Perspective, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2000, p. 8. 
2
 From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated, edited and with an introduction by H.H. 
GERTH, C. WRIGHT MILLS, Oxford University Press, New York, 1958, pp. 77-128. 
3 I borrow the language and part of the argument from Gil EYAL, Iván SZELENYI, and 
Eleanor TOWNSLEY, Making Capitalism without Capitalists. The New Ruling Elites in Eastern Europe, 
Verso, London and New York, 1998. 
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be represented through ideological debates, legal norms and political competition. 
In an era when most parties have become ”parties without partisans” and political 
behaviors prove to be more and more fragmented and individualized1, the Social 
Democrat Party knew for a significant amount of time how to act as a mediator 
and, in this capacity, relied upon the participative practices of the groups of inter-
ests that dominate civil society (trade unions, entrepreneurs’ or professional asso-
ciations, churches2 etc.). 
Indeed, one of the most hazardous illusions of Romanian post-communism is 
perhaps the uncritical identification of civil society with the civic associations, the 
NGOs, and the intellectual elites. Indeed, for most Romanians, the very notion of 
civil society does not refer to the citizens’ participation in the public life through 
grass roots associations, but to the ”professionals”, which chair non-governmental 
organizations. With the significant exception of the Social Democrats, the other 
parties, notwithstanding if they had a past prior to 1948, or were thriving in win-
ning the popular vote (in 1996 and 2004) nurture this misconception and strive to 
legitimate themselves through policies aimed at promoting human rights and civil 
liberties. Hence, they were not aware that the ideology of individual rights in society 
is accompanied by a ”recession of politics” that translates the inability of democ-
ratic politics to govern a society of individuals3. In this respect, civil society should 
rather be construed as a multiple and unstable network of disorganized solidarities 
in need of a mediation and unmoved by partisan representation. 
It is fair to say the Social Democrat Party of Romania, as a scion of the Commu-
nist Party and the dominant post-communist party, extended its mediation across a 
coalescence of loose and uneven networks of a civil society that was, and perhaps 
still is reluctant to turn into a legal society. Indeed, this society is shaped by former 
residents of state socialism, who used to live enclosed in an Eigen-Sinn4, in a space 
where they could almost peacefully indulge in a homegrown individual mi-
cro-autonomy, largely tolerated by the communist authorities. They did not contrive 
competition, but were impelled to react whenever faced with contending interests at 
their own level and within their individual or corporate reach. In the realm of state 
socialism, people got in the end a clear share of sovereignty, they were able to dis-
criminate in any particular setting of society between what they could actually do to 
improve their status or condition and what they could not do, and did not even need 
to bother about, regardless of the official position of the Party. 
The networks of obligations weaved in the framework of socialist agriculture5 
and reshuffled by its dismissal are still performing in the rural areas to the benefit 
of the Social Democrats. Instead, the massive privatizations undertaken by the 
government from 2001 to 2004 made urban populations related to industrial work 
                                                
1 Russel J. DALTON, Martin P. WATTENBERG, ”Partisan Change and the Democratic 
Process”, in Russel J. DALTON, Martin P. WATTENBERG (eds), Parties without Partisans. Pol-
itical Change in Advanced Industrial Societies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp. 261-285. 
2 Several Social Democrat mayors, in Arad and other towns of the Western regions of the 
country, are leaders of local Baptist communities rounded up by the party in order to maximize 
its electoral chances.  
3 Marcel GAUCHET, La démocratie contre elle-même, Gallimard, Paris, 2002, pp. 326-385. 
4 For the definition of the concept and its historical embodiments see Alf LÜDTKE, 
Eigen-Sinn, Ergebnisse Verlag, Hamburg, 2002. 
5 Katherine VERDERY, The Vanishing Hectare. Property and Value in Postsocialist Transyl-
vania, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2003, pp. 60-63. 
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uninteresting for the power brokers of the Social Democrat Party. In return, active 
and retired workers, for whom industrial work was the only opportunity for social 
networking and political participation, experienced an aggravated lack of political 
agency. They were not even convinced by the generous dispensation of welfare, 
amounting in 2004 to over 10% of the GDP. The members of the Romanian society 
dislocated and disaffected by the plummeting of the socialist networks of partici-
pation to the informal redistribution of public resources, reacted with preemptive 
obedience to such operations, but did not see them tied to a meaningful order of 
things, as they used to look at the socialist welfare state1. The Social Democrat 
Party acted no longer as a mediator able to make the state and its agencies avail-
able to them. 
In 1946, the Communist Party proceeded to a political disenfranchisement of 
the Romanian citizens. The very day the universal suffrage was granted for the 
first time to all men and women, the vote turned into derision by governmental 
resolution. For five decades, Romanians were ordered to take part in electoral fes-
tivals with predetermined results. Their counterfeit political rights were however 
balanced by new social prospects that led eventually to a particular type of partici-
pation in the make-up of informal public choices. Post-communism defined itself 
not as a reconstructed state based on representation and as a democratized polity 
nurtured by the rule of law, but as a political regime that qualifies as democratic 
since it is simply holding regular multi-party elections. Particracy and dualism 
made sure that these elections are not meant to summarize in a deliberative and 
legislative body the will and values of the political society, but to measure the 
share each established political party is entitled to have in the post-electoral nego-
tiation of the executive body. Elections are not conceived as a mirror in which soci-
ety reflects its cleavages in order to conciliate them without violence2, but as a 
weighing machine for partisan distribution of offices and privileges. In short, elec-
tions are not representing society, but introducing the government and reproduc-
ing the state. Technically, they are rather particratic than democratic. Procedural 
democracy is pitted against the very meaning of democracy. In post-communist 
Romania, elections seem to be an instrument of democracy used to disenfranchise 
for the second time a disaffected sovereign people. 
 
                                                
1 This is, for instance, the conclusion of a significant number of interviews conducted with 
women workers of Cluj, Denisa Florentina BOTEANU, ”Infern sau paradis pierdut? Aspecte 
din viaţa muncitoarelor din Cluj-Napoca”, in Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Orală, V, 2004, 
pp. 306-336. 
2 Cf. the definitions of Pierre ROSANVALLON, La crise de l’État-providence, nouvelle 
édition, Seuil, Paris, 1992, p. 104. 
